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Crazy Minimalism 
Review of H. Cappelen and E. Lepore 
Insensitive Semantics (Blackwell 2004)
*
 
 
I 
In the beginning was literalism : the view that (give or take a bit) the conventional meaning of 
a sentence is its truth-conditional content. As the ordinary language philosophers rightly 
argued, literalism can‘t be right, because sentences are context-sensitive : in vacuo, they do 
not carry content, but do so only ‗in context‘. Still, the history of the philosophy of language 
in the twentieth century can be described as a succession of attempts to defend literalism 
against the obvious counter-examples by softening it and making it weaker and weaker.
1
 The 
currently fashionable version I dubbed ‗minimalism‘ (Recanati 1989, 1993). According to 
minimalism, the truth-conditional content of a sentence is not identical to its conventional 
meaning, but it departs from it only when the sentence itself, in virtue of its conventional 
meaning, makes an appeal to context mandatory in order to provide a value for some 
indexical expression or free variable in need of saturation. 
 Like most philosophers of language, Cappelen and Lepore are minimalists, but they 
defend a fairly radical version of minimalism, close to the literalist ideal. Instead of 
multiplying indexical variables, as other minimalists do, they maintain that there is only a 
very short list of indexical expressions and that sentences not including any of them are such 
that their meaning is their truth-conditional content. Thus they hold that, if we put tense aside, 
sentences like ‗John is ready‘ or ‗Steel is strong enough‘, which most theorists consider 
context-sensitive, actually express complete propositions independent of context. To be sure, 
such sentences invite the question : ‗for what ?‘ (‗ready for what?‘ ‗strong enough for 
what?‘), and it is the context that enables us to answer such questions ; but Cappelen and 
Lepore hold that the sentences nevertheless express complete propositions independent of 
                                                 
*
 I am indebted to Pranav Anand, Liz Camp, Patrick Hawley and Andrew Nevins, who 
participated in a collective reading of Insensitive Semantics at Harvard in the fall of 2004, to 
Sarah Jane Leslie, who sent me her remarks, and to Philippe de Brabanter and Barry Smith, 
who commented on an earlier version of this review. I am also grateful to the European 
Science Foundation EUROCORES programme ‗The Origin of Man, Language and 
Languages‘ for supporting my research in that area. 
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 See section 1 of my ‗Literalism and Contextualism : Some Varieties‘. 
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context. Which propositions ? They don‘t tell us. They say it‘s an issue for  the 
metaphysician, not the semanticist. The semanticist ought to be content with biconditionals 
such as : ‘Steel is strong enough’ is true if and only if steel is strong enough, and ‘John is 
ready’ is true if and only if John is ready. 
 It is, of course, very hard to take this position seriously. Still, it is worth looking at the 
argument which led two able philosophers to risk their reputation in the service of that 
position. Inspired by the abusing (and amusing) tone adopted by Cappelen and Lepore in their 
entertaining manifesto, I will call the position in question Crazy Minimalism. 
 
II 
The standard criterion for context-sensitivity has two sides. First, a context-sensitive 
expression carries different values in different contexts. C&L refer to this as the context-
shifting condition. Thus ‗you‘ refers to Jim when the speaker addresses Jim, and it refers to 
Paul when the speaker addresses Paul. This, however, is not sufficient. Many expressions 
carry different values in different contexts because the context adds something to their 
constant meaning ; but that additional component may often be considered as external to 
semantic content proper. Thus conversational implicatures are standardly treated as contextual 
components of meaning that do not impinge upon semantic content. For there to be context-
sensitivity in the strict sense, it must be the case that, without a contribution from context, the 
expression would not carry a complete content. This is the incompleteness condition. When 
the two conditions are met (context-shifting, and incompleteness) we can conclude that the 
expression at issue is context-sensitive. By this criterion, ‗Steel is strong enough‘ is context-
sensitive. First, it carries different values in different contexts C1 and C2 whenever C1 and 
C2 provide different answers to the ‗for what ?‘ question ; second, without a contribution 
from context, the sentence is intuitively felt to be ‗incomplete‘ : we are unable to evaluate it 
as true or false, just as we cannot evaluate ‗he is bald‘ unless we are told who, in context, the 
pronoun ‗he‘ refers to. 
 The argument for Crazy Minimalism proceeds in two steps. First, C&L argue against 
the standard criterion ; that is the destructive part of their proposal. The constructive part 
consists in offering an alternative, more demanding criterion, according to which only a very 
restricted set of expressions are context-sensitive. 
 
III 
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To undermine the standard criterion, C&L borrow an argument from the most radical 
opponents of literalism : those I dubbed ‗contextualists‘ (Recanati 1993 : 267, 2004a : 90). 
According to these philosophers, sentences can never express complete propositions 
independent of context, however explicit speakers try to be. In other words, content is always 
under-determined by the linguistic material. Thus suppose we start from the sentence ‗Steel is 
strong enough‘. We feel that, in order to evaluate the sentence, we must first answer the 
question : strong enough for what ? Let us make that explicit so as to get rid of context 
dependence : ‗Steel is strong enough to hold the roof‘. But this, the contextualist argues, is not 
enough. If we want to evaluate ‗Steel is strong enough to hold the roof‘, we need to be told 
for how long the roof needs to be supported, or which quantity of steel is needed to do the 
supporting. Again, the context is supposed to provide answers to these questions, and in order 
to get rid of context-sensitivity we must make the answers explicit in the sentences 
themselves. At this point, the contextualist argues, we are led into an infinite regress ; each 
time we explicitly answer one such question, the answer itself raises further questions which 
the context has to implicitly answer. 
 The contextualist concludes that context-sensitivity ought to be generalized : no 
natural language sentence wears its truth-conditional content on its sleeves. C&L accept the 
contextualist argument, but, being conservative literalists, they reject the conclusion. They 
argue for a different conclusion : since the standard criterion for context-sensitivity (viz. 
context-shifting plus incompleteness) leads to the generalization of context-sensitivity, we 
should reject the criterion. And so they do — they offer a new criterion for telling when an 
expression is context sensitive and when it isn‘t. Using the new criterion, they are in a 
position to argue that very few expressions are actually context-sensitive. 
 
IV 
Before considering C&L‘s new criterion, let us scrutinize their argument so far. That 
argument is, in several respects, gappy. 
 First, the argument has force only for someone who antecedently rejects the 
contextualist conclusion. Cappelen and Lepore‘s book is addressed to their fellow 
minimalists, whom they urge to reject the standard criterion for context-sensitivity because it 
is too liberal. That criterion, they argue, pushes us down a slippery slope since (via the 
contextualist argument) it leads to the generalization of context-sensitivity. For a literalist, of 
whatever stripe, this is indeed unacceptable. But nothing has been done to convince an 
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unbiased philosopher that it is a mistake to generalize context-sensitivity. C&L merely 
presuppose that contextualism is wrong. 
 On behalf of Cappelen and Lepore, one may try to fill the gap by providing an 
argument against the contextualist conclusion. The following seems to be close to what they 
have in mind : 
 
(Distinctiveness) 
The generalization of context-sensitivity is unacceptable because there is something 
distinctive — hence not generalizable — about indexicals and the other context-
sensitive expressions that have been listed in the early literature on the topic (the 
expressions in the ‗Basic Set‘). 
  
Even so, C&L‘s argument remains gappy. One ought to reject the standard criterion for 
context-sensitivity, they say, because it leads to the (unacceptable) generalization of context-
sensitivity. But does it ? It has been argued that the form of incompleteness which the 
contextualist argument generalizes — ‗top-down incompleteness‘, as we might call it — is 
different in kind from the ‗bottom-up‘ incompleteness which the standard criterion invokes 
(see Recanati 2004a : 93-95 and 139-140). It follows that there are two forms of context-
sensitivity, corresponding to the pragmatic processes I call ‗saturation‘ and ‗modulation‘ 
respectively. If this is right, then one can deny that the standard criterion leads to the 
generalization of context-sensitivity, since the form of context-sensitivity which the 
contextualist argument generalizes is not that which the standard criterion captures. By the 
same token, one can deny that the generalization of context-sensitivity to which the 
contextualist argument leads conflicts in any way with Distinctiveness. What is distinctive of 
indexicals etc. is the fact that they are context-sensitive in the ‗bottom-up‘ sense, that is, they 
are in need of saturation. This is compatible with the fact that, in the top-down sense, every 
expression — or, perhaps, every complex expression — is context-sensitive since it requires 
contextual modulation in order to express a definite content (or at least, in order to express the 
content it does). 
 To be sure, one may be skeptical of the distinction between the two kinds of 
incompleteness. A radical contextualist will typically be skeptical. But if one wants to use the 
contextualist argument, plus Distinctiveness, to argue against the standard criterion, one needs 
to discuss that crucial issue. C&L don‘t do so, and that is a gap in their argument. 
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V 
Let us now turn to C&L‘s new criterion for context-sensitivity. The basic idea is that context-
sensitive expressions ‗block inter-contextual disquotation‘, that is, they make homophonic 
reports impossible across contexts. Thus if Bush said on June 3, 2003 ‗I wasn‘t ready 
yesterday‘, Lepore cannot report his utterance homophonically by saying, on June 5, ‗Bush 
said that I wasn‘t ready yesterday‘. Adjustment of indexicals has to take place to capture what 
Bush actually said. But, Cappelen and Lepore argue, no such adjustment is required when the 
expression at issue does not belong to the Basic Set. This provides Cappelen and Lepore with 
the following test for context-sensitivity : 
 
Suppose you suspect, or at least want to ascertain whether, e is context-sensitive. Take 
an utterance u of a sentence S containing e in context C. Let C‘ be a context relevantly 
different from C (i.e., different according to the standards significant according to 
contextualists about e). If there‘s a true disquotational indirect report of u in C‘, then 
that‘s evidence S is context insensitive. (p. 89) 
 
Run-of-the-mill context-sensitive expressions such as ‗I‘ or ‗yesterday‘ do block inter-
contextual disquotation, so they pass the test, as we have just seen. But consider ‗ready‘, 
whose context-sensitive nature C&L deny. Does it block inter-contextual disquotation ? 
According to C&L, the answer is a resounding ‗no‘ : 
 
We‘re imagining the following two contexts of utterance of (1) : 
 
(1) John is ready 
 
Context of utterance C1. In a conversation about exam preparation, someone 
raises the question of whether John is well prepared. Nina utters (1). 
Context of utterance C2. Three people are about to leave an apartment ; they 
are getting dressed for heavy rain. Nina utters (1). 
 
Here‘s a pretty obvious fact : whichever of these contexts of utterance we consider, no 
matter how dissimilar you think they are from each other, each of [Nina’s] utterances 
can still be reported disquotationally. To ensure this is utterly obvious, we‘ll right 
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now engage in actual speech acts… In (1.1) we report on her utterance in (C1), in (1.2) 
her utterance in C2 : 
 
(1.1) Nina said that John is ready. 
(1.2) Nina said that John is ready. 
(1.3) In both C1 and C2, Nina said that John is ready. 
(p. 90-91) 
 
(1.1) – (1.3) are supposed to be uttered in a context C3 (the ‗storytelling context‘) distinct 
both from C1 and C2. And the fact that, despite the differences between C1, C2 and C3, the 
same expression ‗ready‘ may be used in C3 to report what the speaker said in either C1 or C2 
(or, perhaps, as in (1.3), what the speaker said in both C1 and C2) shows that the expression 
in question is not really context-sensitive — its semantic value stays constant from context to 
context, despite the illusory intuition that what (1) says differs when we move from C1 to C2. 
 
VI 
Cappelen and Lepore‘s new criterion (inter-contextual disquotation) yields results that 
apparently conflict with those we get by using the standard criterion. So what is going on ? 
Cappelen and Lepore argue that the standard criterion uses the wrong kind of ‗context shifting 
argument‘ (CSA), i.e. the wrong kind of scenario intended to elicit intuitions about context-
sensitivity. 
 C&L draw a distinction between two types of CSA. The standard criterion draws upon 
what they call an Impoverished CSA (ICSA). An ICSA is a description of two target contexts 
C1 and C2 such that a given expression e allegedly carries different values with respect to C1 
and C2. This (together with incompleteness intuitions) is supposed to show that e is context-
sensitive. C&L reject that conclusion : they hold that ICSAs systematically elicit illusory 
intuitions. Instead, they suggest that one should use a more complex type of scenario which 
they call a Real CSA (RCSA). RCSAs are distinguished from ICSAs by the fact that the 
expression e is not merely mentioned, but actually used in the storytelling context, i.e. in the 
context C3 in which the use of e in C1 and/or C2 is being described and reported. Whereas 
ICSAs involve two ‗target contexts‘ C1 and C2, and an alleged shift in semantic value from 
C1 to C2, RCSAs additionally involve the ‗storytelling context‘ C3. In C3 the alleged 
context-sensitive expression whose semantic value is supposed to shift from C1 to C2 is used 
to report what was said in C1 and/or C2 ; and the fact that the expression e can be used in the 
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storytelling context to report what was said in the target context C1/C2 shows that the 
expression carries the same content in C1, C2 and C3, hence that it is not really context-
sensitive, superficial intuitions notwithstanding. Were it context-sensitive, inter-contextual 
disquotation would be blocked as we move from C1/C2 to C3. 
 
VII 
I have just expounded Cappelen and Lepore‘s Master Argument in favour of Crazy 
Minimalism. What are we to think of it ? If I were Cappelen and Lepore, I would say that it 
fails miserably (one of their favorite expressions). And it does ! Since they first put forward 
their idea, so many people came up with so many counterexamples that I will not try to be 
original ; I will simply borrow one here to make my point. The following example — actually 
an elaboration on Cappelen and Lepore‘s own example —is due to Sarah Jane Leslie : 
 
John is on the job market, and about to be interviewed for his dream job. 
Unfortunately, he is very lazy and hasn‘t bothered to prepare for the interview at all. 
He can barely even remember what his thesis is about, and is unbelievably nervous. 
Looking at him, his thesis advisor says: ―Well, at least John‘s ready.‖ The department 
chair appropriately responds: ―Are you out of your mind? He‘s clearly not ready!‖ 
(…) 
The night before John‘s APA nightmare, he was very hungry. People were going out 
for dinner, and inquired if John was in a position to eat dinner right then. He was 
indeed ready to eat dinner, and appropriately responded, ―Yes, I‘m ready‘. John‘s 
thesis advisor overheard this, and the next day, as John awaited his interview in terror, 
the advisor adduces this comment as support for his claim that John is ready. He says: 
―Hey, last night he said himself that he was ready.‖ 
 
The advisor‘s homophonic report, ‗Last night he said himself that he was ready‘, is clearly 
inappropriate in this context. In this context ‗ready‘ means ready for the interview, but when 
John said ‗I am ready‘ the day before he meant that he was ready to eat dinner. This example 
shows that homophonic reports are not always possible with expressions such as ‘ready’. 
There are contexts in which homophonic reports are blocked when the sentence at issue 
contains an expression like ‗ready‘. 
 This is not to deny that, in other contexts, homophonic reports may be possible. 
Whether or not an homophonic report is possible depends upon a number of factors, and, in 
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particular, it depends upon the storytelling context (the context in which the report is made). 
Some storytelling contexts are altruistic : they track, and ‗absorb‘, the settings of the 
parameters in force in the target context. Other storytelling contexts are selfish (as in Leslie‘s 
story): they impose their own settings and override those in force in the target context. It is 
very easy to manipulate the storytelling context so as to make it selfish or not, and when we 
do so we see that the possibility or impossibility of homophonic reports straightforwardly 
follows. Indeed, as I pointed out, Leslie‘s example is only a variant of Cappelen and Lepore‘s 
own example. To block inter-contextual disquotation, Leslie only had to do two things : (i) 
make a certain setting for the relevant parameter salient in the storytelling context and (ii) 
ensure that the original setting of the parameter in the target context was not mutually 
manifest to the conversational protagonists in the storytelling context. 
 The trivial observation that the possibility or impossibility of homophonic reports 
depends upon the context in which the report is made is sufficient to dispose of Cappelen and 
Lepore‘s theory. Cappelen and Lepore offer an explanation for the fact that homophonic 
reports are — at least sometimes — possible across contexts, with expressions such as 
‗ready‘. Their explanation goes as follows : homophonic reports are possible because the 
expression at issue is context insensitive. Were that explanation correct, however, 
homophonic reports would always be possible ; but they are not, as the Leslie example shows. 
So this explanation is out. Another explanation goes like this : homophonic reports are 
possible when there is a certain relation between the storytelling context and the target 
context, a relation in virtue of which the storytelling context inherits the values of the target 
context. Evidently, this is the correct explanation, at least for a wide range of cases.
2
 
 
VIII 
As Cappelen and Lepore notice, the cases of inter-contextual disquotation they bring to our 
attention are counterexamples to claims about context-sensitivity only if the storytelling 
context (the context in which the homophonic report is made) is ‗relevantly different‘ from 
the target context in which the expression at issue was originally used. If the storytelling 
context is altruistic, there will be no relevant difference : the storytelling context will ‗match 
the contextual features relevant in the original utterance‘ (p. 91). This matching process 
                                                 
2
 There are also cases of homophonic report that ought to be accounted for in terms of covert 
quotation. Covert quotation is quite common when speech act verbs are used. 
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characteristic of altruistic contexts is a form of accommodation whose possibility C&L 
themselves consider, and which they call ‗Contextual Salience Absorption‘. 
 C&L think they have a knock-down objection to the explanation in terms of 
Contextual Salience Absorption, however. They think a contextualist (as they call whoever 
rejects literalism) cannot accept this explanation without commiting theoretical suicide. Why 
is that so ? Because what is at stake in the literalism/contextualism controversy is the status of 
the following schema : 
 
Literalist schema : 
(Whatever the context) the sentence‗S‘ expresses the proposition that S. 
 
According to C&L, every instance of the schema is true when the sentence that substitutes for 
‗S‘ in the schema does not contain an expression from the Basic Set. In particular 
 
(2) 
(Whatever the context) the sentence ‗John is ready‘ expresses the proposition that John is 
ready. 
 
The contextualist denies this. According to the contextualist, (2) is false, just as (3) is false :  
 
(3) 
(Whatever the context) the sentence ‗I am hungry‘ expresses the proposition that I am hungry. 
 
(3) is false, because the sentence ‗I am hungry‘, uttered by Cappelen, expresses the 
proposition that Cappelen is hungry and not the proposition that I am hungry. Similarly, (2) is 
false, when uttered in a context in which ‗ready‘ means ready for the interview, since there 
are contexts in which the sentence ‗John is ready‘ does not express the proposition that John 
is ready for the interview. 
 It is essential for the contextualist to come up with such counterexamples to (2), and to 
the literalist schema more generally. ‗But‘, Cappelen and Lepore point out, ‗to endorse 
Contextual Salience Absorption is in effect to grant that no such intuitive counterexample is 
forthcoming‘ (p. 115). They argue that Contextual Salience Absorption guarantees the 
validity of the literalist schema, hence makes it impossible for the contextualist to win her 
case by providing the right kind of counterexample. ‗Appeal to Contextual Salience 
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Absorption is not a defense of contextualism‘, they conclude ; ‗rather, it‘s a concession of 
defeat‘ (p. 115). 
 Once again, the argument fails miserably. Appeal to Contextual Salience Absorption 
would be self-defeating in this manner only if Contextual Salience Absorption was automatic, 
in such a way that there cannot be any divergence between the target context and the 
storytelling context as far as the contextual value of ‗ready‘ is concerned. But such 
divergences are possible, as the Leslie example shows. This is sufficient for the contextualist 
to make her point and win her case. It is true that Cappelen and Lepore define Contextual 
Salience Absorption as a process that is ‗automatically triggered‘ as soon as, in a storytelling 
context, we imaginatively place ourselves in a target context (p. 114). But the claim that 
Contextual Salience Absorption is automatic and takes place come what may, independently 
of the features of the storytelling context, is obviously not a claim which the contextualist will 
accept. From a contextualist point of view, Contextual Salience Absorption takes place only 
in some of the cases, typically those in which the value of the relevant parameter in the target 
context is salient, mutually manifest and relevant to the protagonists in the storytelling 
context. Cappelen and Lepore‘s argument fails because, once the automaticity of Contextual 
Salience Absorption is rejected, the validity of the literalist schema is no longer guaranteed. 
As a result, the contextualist can have her cake and eat it : she can invoke Contextual Salience 
Absorption to account for the homophonic cases, and she can simultaneously invoke the other 
cases (the Leslie cases) to argue against the literalist schema. 
 
IX 
I have said enough to establish that C&L‘s position is untenable. This does not mean that I 
disagree with everything they say, however. In particular, I do not want to deny that there are 
differences between expressions in the Basic Set and other (alleged) context-sensitive 
expressions, such as ‗ready‘ ; nor that some of those differences may have to do with the 
availability of homophonic reports, collective descriptions, etc. But the conclusion should not 
be that expressions like ‗ready‘ are not really context-sensitive. Rather, one should be 
prepared to acknowledge differences within the class of context-sensitive expressions : they 
don‘t all behave similarly. 
 Even if we concentrate upon the Basic Set, one finds considerable differences within 
the set — not only between demonstratives and pure indexicals (Kaplan 1989), but also, as 
has often been noticed, within the class of pure indexicals. Thus ‗here‘ and ‗now‘ behave very 
differently from ‗today‘ and ‗tomorrow‘, and the tenses behave very differently from both. 
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Even the twins ‗here‘ and ‗now‘ greatly differ from each other : ‗now‘ is more ‗shiftable‘ than 
‗here‘ (Recanati 2004b). That is not without consequences for C&L‘s discussion : with ‗now‘, 
contrary to what they claim, inter-contextual disquotation is (sometimes) possible. Thus I can 
report John‘s utterance of ‗Now I am hungry‘ by uttering, much later, ‗He said that now he 
was hungry‘. One should look at all this in much more detail than C&L themselves are 
willing to do. The more we extend the list of context-sensitive expressions, the more we 
should be disposed to register, and explore, fine differences within the class. 
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